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1 Introduction
Evaluations and interpretations of change in the Former Soviet Union (FSU) still differ
significantly. Do we speak about politically motivated reforms or about structural changes,
about intentions or processes, about mistakes or constraints, and so on. The same is true for
identifying reasons for the changes: Were they primarily externally or internally conditioned,
modifications or fundamental redirections – and, of course, are the changes happening for
what-ever reason  successfully, or did they fail?
These differences are due not primarily to a general problem in intellectually penetrating the
post-Soviet transformations, but rather to competing pre-conceptions, different theories and
heterogenous analytical tools employed by various experts and observers.
Basically, there are the following main approaches to interpret changes in the FSU. Some of
them are connected to traditional paradigms of explaining the Soviet system1. Most of them
are hostage to an unrealistic overestimation of state interventionist capabilities.
The more serious research directions are the following:
-- Studies focusing on the change of political institutions (in a narrow sense) and
organizations, often with inbuild assumptions on the „normality“ of Western structures of
political regulation (democratization theories)2. This branch ist relatively well developed
and often intends to combine area competence with general political science interests. Part
if this direction are studies on actors, especially parties and elites3.
-- Analytical projects on the relations between the federal center in Russia (Moscow) and
political territories/  regions (regionalization research)4.
                                                
1 Meyer, Gert (1979), Sozialistische Systeme, Opladen; Gläßner, Gert-Joachim (1982), Sozialistische Systeme,
Opladen.
2 For a good overview see: Parrott, Bruce (1997), Perspectives on postcommunist democratization, in: Karen
Dawisha, Bruce Parrott (eds.), Democratic changes and authoritarian reactions in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus,
and Moldova, Cambridge. Cf.  Merkel, Wolfgang (ed.)(1996), Systemwechsel 2, Opladen; Linz, Juan;
Stepan, Alfred (eds.)(1996), Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South
America, and Post-Communist Europe, Baltimore; Diamond, Larry; Plattner, Marc (eds.)( 1993), The Global
Resurgence of Democracy, Baltimore; Przeworski, Adam (1991), Democracy and the Market: Political and
Economic Reforms in  Eastern Europe and Latin America, Cambridge; Przeworski, Adam (1995),
Sustainable Democracy, Cambridge.
3 Cf. Segbers, Klaus; de Spiegeleire, Stephan (eds.) (1995), Post-Soviet Puzzles. Mapping the Political
Economy of the Former Soviet Union, Vol. III, Baden-Baden; Bos, Ellen (1996), Die Rolle von Eliten und
kollektiven Akteuren in Transitionsprozessen, in: Wolfgang Merkel (ed.), Systemwechsel 1, 81-110; Lapina,
Natalia (1997), Die Wirtschaftseliten im Kräftefeld der rußländischen Politik, in: Berichte des BIOst,
16/1997, Köln; Petuchow, Wladimir; Wjunizkij, Wladimir (1997), Die Rolle rußländischer Wirtschaftseliten
im Jahre 1996, in: Berichte des BIOst, 17/1997, Köln; Easter, Gerald M. (1996), Personal Networks and
Postrevolutionary State Building, in: World Politics, 48.2, 551-578.
4 Segbers, Klaus; de Spiegeleire, Stephan (eds.) (1995), Post-Soviet Puzzles. Mapping the Political Economy
of the Former Soviet Union, Vol. II, Baden-Baden; Schwanitz, Simone, Transformationsforschung: Area
Studies versus Politikwissenschaft? In: Arbeitsberichte des Osteuropa-Instituts der FU Berlin, 3.1997, Berlin;
Projekt Siehl/ Cline (to be published in 1998):
-- Studies an economic change, mostly on macroeconomic developments and policies,
privatization strategies (often with a regional aspect), network relations and foreign
economic performances of the transformation countries5.
-- Research on the international context of the East European changes and ist impact on these
developments6.
-- Cultural studies (in a broad sense), including deliberations on the supposed Russian
osobennost’ (Sonderweg), but also studies and preconditions for civil society (social
capital)
-- And, finally, deconstruvtivist attempts to discuss texts and interpretations of  post-Soviet
change7.
In contrast to most, but building upon some of these paradigms, in this paper I want to present
an  analytical approach which uses the concept of institutional change and which, in my view,
avoids some problems produced or accentuated by alternate interpretations. I think that this
approach is able to offer a sufficiently plausible framework for explaining change in the FSU.
This approach requires something which still is a daring undertaking for many of us: A
critical re-interpretation of the conventional assumptions regarding the the Soviet Union, its
working conditions, its crises, its transformation and other aspects. I start with this attempt of
reinterpretation. In a second step, I try to identify some of those institutions which are
changing; and then, thirdly, the relevant structures and actors who define (stimulate and
constrain) the changes, and who are themselves influenced by the ongoing transformations.
The fourth step tries to address the relevant domestic and international structures, the
framework for the ongoing changes, before the relevant actors are identified. A  a brief
outlook on Russian international behavior under such conditions concludes this paper.
But the first step towards a fresh look at the current processes and events of change is a new
glance at the Soviet Union itself, thereby challenging some traditional ways of
conceptualizing it.
                                                
5 Peter Rutland, Business Lobbies in Contemporary Russia, in: The International Spectator, 32.1 (Jan.-March
1997), 23-38; Mau, Vladimir; Stupin, Vadim (1997), The Political Economy of Russian Regionalism, in:
Communist Economies & Economic Transformation, 9.1, 5-26; Stark, David (1993), Path Dependency and
Privatization Strategies in East Central Europe, in: Transformation der Wirtschaftssysteme in
Ostmitteleuropa, München, 11-39; Harter, Stefanie (1997), Wirtschaftliche Transformationen in Rußland:
Ein Netzwerkansatz, in: Arbeitspapiere des Osteuropa-Instituts der FU Berlin, 5. 1997, Berlin.
6 In generell: Wallerstein, Immanuel (1979), The Capitalist World Economy, New York;  Cox, Robert (1986),
Social Forces, States, and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory, in: Robert O. Keohane
(ed.), Neorealism and Its Critics, New York; related to the transformation processes in the FSU: Deudney,
Daniel; Ikenberry, John G. (1992), The International Sources of Soviet Change, in: International Security,
16.3, 74-118; Risse-Kappen, Thomas (1994), Ideas do not float freely: transnational coalitions, domestic
structures, and the end of the cold war, in: International Organization, 48.2, 185-214; Evangelista, Matthew
(1995), The paradox of the state strength: transnational relations, domestic structures, and security policy in
Russia and the Soviet Union, in: International Organization, 49.1, 1-38; Altvater, Elmar (1996), Der
Megatrend der Globalisierung und die Spielräume regionaler Integration von Transformationsgesellschaften -
Der globale Kontext regionaler Integration in Zentralasien, Berlin, mimeo.
7 Epstein, Mikhail (1995), After the Future. The Paradox of Postmodernism and Contemporary Russian
Culture, Amherst;  Medvedev, Sergei (1995), Deconstruction of the Text. At the Occasion of the 77th
Anniversary of Soviet Discourse, in: Segber, de Spiegeleire (1995), 83-120.
2 The USSR and its end
The West treated the USSR often as an alternative model of development. While the Soviet
Union certainly deviated from classical examples of modernization – like the paths taken by
the OECD countries --, it never really was a second, alternative world power. For this role, it
lacked a sufficient economic base, and its culture did not develop the attraction to penetrate or
dominate other cultures. The Soviet Union was mostly oriented towards the world market, by
copying and simulating it, by permanently catching up with and, at the same time, distancing
itself from this powerful regulator. In any case, the Soviet Union became increasingly
dependent on the world market’s laws.
Domestically and politically, it was never that much centralized as suggested by and
described in Soviet and Western textbooks. In the fields of politics and economics and in
social relations, there was ample room for competing interests, manouevering, and for
bargaining between distinct groups and actors. These groups and actors, in detail to be
descibed below, were active in at least four spheres. These fields also defined the real political
spaces of the Soviet model: territories (union republics, regions etc.); the big economic
sectors; patron-client-relations (often shaped by regional, generational or functional aspects);
and, finally, societal organizations. Across these fields, network relations were instrumental as
a structural feature of Soviet-type models. In these dimensions, thus, the four main groupings
of influential players were active: regions, sectors, clans, and societal groups.
These groups did not act autonomously – in the sense of a civil society --, but often quite
distinct from each other and from the state. The CPSU, then, was less a homogeneous actor
than the place where these groups competed and negotiated. Tendencies of  an all-
encompassing bargaining system which was in place even in the times of stalinism increased
after 1953 and finally led to a system of mediation (exchange) and regulation which we call
administrative market (AM).
This interpretation of Soviet-type regulation through bargaining actors organized in the
framework of the CPSU shapes the analytical focus in a certain way: It accentuates the
continuities between Soviet and post-Soviet regulative mechanisms against the supposed
rupturous events (the beginning of perestroika 1985, the end of the USSR 1991; by the way,
one could also mention the revolutions of 1917); and, secondly, the focus of the analysis shifts
from the state-level toward an institutional and actor-related level.
This view of  Soviet history is not only able to deliver more adequate insights into the FSU; it
also sharpens the view on post-Soviet realities. But to complete the necessary reinterpetation,
another step is required: a fresh view on the crises which caused the collapse of the USSR, as
well as on the factors which shaped the reactions on these challenges.
The decisive crisis of the traditional Soviet model was, beyond any doubt, caused by
endogenous factors. The extensive mode of production of the classical Soviet economy,
created in the late 20s, was unreversibly exhausted in the 70s. The reasons  for this
development were multifold (demographic trends, location of resources, of arable land,
capital building etc.) and can be left aside here.8 The important point is that the stability of the
                                                
8 See Klaus Segbers, Der sowjetische Systemwandel. Frankfurt/Main 1989, especally chapter  4.
political regulation by the state which rested on the availability of resources for
(re)distribution by the federal center in Moscow and of  transfer payments from the state
budget to the various competing regional and sectoral lobbies was undermined by the final
crisis of the formally administered economy. In this situation, a fundamental regime change
was inevitable. It was initiated by the election of M.S. Gorbachev, which became a – the –
symbol  of the pressure for a systemic change.
This significant change of the traditional Soviet system itself was constrained and partly
shaped by international conditions. The ever increasing integration of the world economy, the
significant role of international communication, the more and more effective international
standards and regimes (patterns of comsumption, human rights, economy of time etc.), the
increasing weight of international  transnational actors and regimes precluded effectively any
options for isolated ways of coping with the Soviet crises.
Against this background, the most important and decisive directions of the systemic change
were not unclear. On the contrary, they were more or less pre-determined: Towards a
dominant regulation of the domestic economy by market relations, towards a definite
integration into the world economy, and towards a broadening of  participation channels and
autonomy for the post-Soviet society (not to be confused with formal attributes of Western
political regulation).
The post-Soviet developments, then, can analytically be described in a fruitful double
formula: Regarding the domestic crises and international constraints, they are dependent
variables which can and must be described; and they are at the same time independent
variables, shaping the institutional change on the various levels and of the important groups
of actors.
This kind of perspective determines a space for analysis which is relatively well founded, and
which encourages more detailed analysis.
Starting from this point, I want to address – briefly – the following questions:
- What institutions are important and effective, and how stable are they? Here I suggest the
approach of institutional change that started in the USSR and that has been accelerated  since
1985, and which holds on today. This is the independent variable.
-- What are the domestic and international structures relevant for institutional change? The
change itself is understood as a function of  domestic and foreign constellations. It serves
therefore as dependent variable.
-- What are the relevant actors? The change itself  determines the relevant spheres of activity
and the direction of their development, and it determines the space in which the relevant
actors can move. The change is, then, the independent variable.
[-- What, finally, are realistic options in the West for influencing  the changes in the FSU?
How to place the change, which here is the dependent variable, in the international
context?]
For answering these questions, transformation theories are useful.  Comparative studies are
especially fruitful in connection with institutional change approaches. But they also
demonstrate important differences between actual transformations in Eastern Europe and
systemic changes that took place in other regions and in other times. The changes in Eastern
Europe and the FSU are more far-reaching than, let’s say, in southern Europe in the 70s.
Every transformation is comparable with others, but each of them also shows its specific
features. In the case of the FSU, simultaneous changes in the political, economic, social and
cultural regulation are going on. This observation is the reason for stressing the importance of
path dependencies – and their description – in the case of the FSU, which can and must be
described in the context of institutional change approaches.
3 Which institutions work,  and how stable are they?
The conditions in which the historical changes in the FSU were embedded were heterogenous.
All parts of the traditional Soviet model were touched and remodeled. But the accelerated
changes of all institutions did not happen in a synchronous way. Rather, a key feature of the
changes in the economy, politics, social life and culture was the lack of simultaneity and
similarity. This colourful panorama was accompanied by the inevitable decomposition of the
Soviet imperium. A consequence of this pattern of development is the multifaceted,
ambigious character of the transformations.
The appropriate way to understand  the historic transformation in the FSU and its often
confusing appearance is to frame all sorts of changes as elements of an ongoing, long-range
process of adaptation and modernization. At the core of this process are not „reforms“ which
must be conceptualized and implemented, but accelerated institutional changes. The much-
beloved ruptures, events, „breaks“, coups and the like are, in this perspective, rather
accompanying phenomena of the deeper institutional change.
Following this reasoning, we should not focus that much on formal norms and rules and
actors (constitutions, laws, ukazy, presidents, political parties etc.), but rather on patterns of
behavior, interests, and the rules which organize the relations between the relevant actors.
These rules may be formalized or informal. The whole set of social and political rules and
relations, including – but not identical with – organizations and symbols, we call institutions.9
In practice, they are binding for all players,  and they are basically observed by them.
Naturally, institutions also worked in the USSR.
This observation generates several questions: What happened to the rules of the game in the
USSR? Where did  the new rules observed today come from? On closer inspection, there are
significant and interesting elements of continuity. This leads to another point: Gradual change
of old norms and rules is more important than the effects of radical discontinuity and of
rupture.
                                                
9 Following Douglass North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge
University Press 1990. Cf. also Holger Schulze, Neo-Institutionalismus. Arbeitspapiere des Osteuropa-
Instituts (FU Berlin), 1997, Nr. 4,  and Gerhard Göhler (ed.), Institutionenwandel. Leviathan-Sonderheft,
Opladen 1997.
Our understanding is, that institutions constrain and stimulate the behavior of relevant actors.
Actors act basically as utility maximizers. The respective utility is defined by the knowledge,
information and horizon of each individual actor. It is not determined according to an
externally defined utility of the whole community.
At the same time, there are clear limits for all sorts of attempts to steer, organize and influence
the transformations. Contrary to many expectations – and ambitions –, events and processes
in the FSU are not that much conceptionalized and implemented on a macro-level, but they
rather happen – as the result of  (rational) choices by a multitude of actors pursuing their
particular interests. The enormous amount of interactions on various levels that are
meaningful for the institutional changes do rarely allow effective forms of coordination by a
political center. This hampers „refomist“ as well as „anti-reformist“ endeavors.
Changes which are the result of the actions of actors in the framework of institutions are, at
the same time, the result of external and internal structures and events. They usually unfold
gradually (incrementelly). Sometimes, they can accelerate and take the form of dramatic,
seemingly radical changes.
These findings have some important and often overlooked consequences for the
understanding of what is happening in Eastern Europe.10 Such an approach directs research
on current transformations towards comparative projects: Institutional change takes place
everywhere. At the same time, it enables the inclusion of specific aspects (path-dependend,
historically and culturally conditioned), without resorting to unprecise sayings like Tyuchev’s
„Rossiju umom ne ponimat’...“.
What is necessary then is the identification of really relevant institutions, of  the relevant units
and levels of analysis, and, finally, the description of those structures which produce and
constrain the current transformations.
Now I want to describe some important institutions – in the sense of norms and rules, formal
and informal – who represent continuity and change of Soviet and post-Soviet regulations,
which co-exist with each other. These institutions constitute the social context which, for
better or worse, shapes social relations in Soviet and post-Soviet times. All of them have
political and social, economic and cultural aspects and connotations.
I also intend to indicate the main directions of change in these institutions.
3.1 State and society: patrimonial relations and informal activities
Traditionally, political, economic and social  relations in Russia and in the USSR were
characterized by a dominant opposition between rulers (czars, politburo) and a formally
disenfranchized society. Property rights were monopolized - formally or informally - by czars
or by the politburo. The society and its groups were not entitled to claim or to gain property
rights. This state of affairs had certain effects on the mentality of groups and individuals, on
their world perception, their risk taking behavior and their inclination to develop initiative.
                                                
10 Cf. Paul Aligica, The Institutionalists’ Take on Transition, in: Transition, Vol. 3 No. 4, 7 March 1997, 46-49.
The state was the key actor11, while the society lacked strength and the ability to act in the
political sphere – at least up into the 50s of this century. In accordance with the increasing
differentiation of the economy and the partly integration into the world economy, relations
between the state and the society also had to change - what they started to do. But, there still
may be remnants of the old patrimonial attitudes (mind-settings) which hamper – or shape --
the current transformations.
At the same time, the boundaries between  state and society were never really clearly fixed.
This opened „a large middle ground of social groups and political formations“, that directly
and indirectly shaped  Soviet politics. As a result, institutional and „infrastructural
weaknesses of the postrevolutionary (as well as the post-Soviet, K.S.) state were eventually
overcome by the intersection of informal social structures and formal political
organizations“.12
Today, the state is either not effective in its actions, or it is not present or visible in the post-
Soviet life. One could argue that to a certain extent the weaknesses of formal structures are
compensated by informal strenghts of Soviet and post-Soviet societies. In the future, this may
turn out as an even greater advantage when qualities related to communication, networking
and bargaining will become decisive characteristics of the 21st century.
3.2 The key to the riddle: resources and property rights
Control and distribution of resources of all kind were, as described above, in fact not that
much centralized in the USSR as usually suggested. After 70 years of – formally – central
allocation and intense bargaining processes over resources, a direct access to them became
possible, which even can be formalized: Rights to use and distribute resources which were
acquired in Soviet times can now be turned into real property rights.
This, of course, necessarily leads to intense competition and struggles between regional,
sectoral, political, social and functional actors, pressure groups and lobbies. Needless to say,
that these battles don’t follow exactly any rules of the game, which also are object of
permanent modifications.  The success or failure of the attempts by these groups to legalize
their resources is a decisive factor in the shifting configuration of power between the various
relevant players, between constitutional organs and the other interest groups in the federal
center, and between and in the 89 "subjects of the federation". These interests and struggles
are, for the time being, the single most important motive for all sorts of conflicts – whatever
their formal pretext allegedly is: I’ts the economy, stupid.
These activities take place on the basis of a not inherently weak, but very heterogenous
potential of  a segmented economy. The economic sectors differ significantly by their
respective level of monopolization (and rent-seeking capabilities), competitiveness on world
                                                
11  See Vladimir Chervyakov, The Russian National Economic Elite in the Political Arena. In: Klaus Segbers,
Stephan De Spiegeleire (eds.), Post-Soviet Puzzles. Mapping the Political Economy of the Former Societ
Union. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1995, Vol. I, 205-282. Chervyakov and his friend and colleague Vladimir
Berezovskii died in a tragic accident early in 1997.
12 Gerald M. Easter, Personal networks and postrevolutionary state building. In: World Politics, 48 (July 1996),
pp. 551-578, here:  556, 557
markets (and access to hard currencies), dependence on the domestic markets (and therefor
dependency on federal and regional state budgets), intensity of privatization (and attractivity
for investments) and, finally, proximity to relevant political circles (and consequently
in/dependency from political lobbies and constellations).
A significant part of this game is being realized between actors involved in shadow-
operations, which are executed in non-formal ways. This is not an exception from the
otherwise orderly rule, not all crime and mafia. About half of all economic operations are
currently realized this way. „The shadow sphere does invest money into the economy, politics
and law - and it reshapes in its own way the institutional system of property, power and
society.“13 The institutional changes in the semi-systems of the official and the shadow
economies, whose boundaries are vague anyway, are closely interconnected.
3.3 Ways of distribution and exchange of goods and services: torgi
It is no secret  that the allocation of goods and resources in the USSR was regulated neither by
a classical market nor by an ideal plan. The distribution of raw materials, the work force, of
resources and goods was realized by a complicated and complex system of  bargaining
activities.
These operations – in Russian: torgi - took place among all functional and positional groups
as well as among individuals. Informal relations, blat, networks --  horizontally as well as
verticalally organized -  played in important role. In the seemingly humoristic forms of
„natural economy“, lines and circular exchange, this phenomenon was known far beyond the
borders of the USSR.
It is helpful to imagine the Soviet society as an intersection of formal functions of individuals
and of their real positions (status). Social relations, formalized in such a way, were the basic
structure of all social, economic and political exchanges which took place. The dominant
rationale of the participants in these exchanges was to enhance, to strengthen, or at least to
hold their relative positions. For this purpose, a multitude of tools was used – and, thus, blat
and other informal activities became a „way of life and an economic necessity“ 14.
This model of explaining the interests and exchange behavior of Soviet actors has become
known as „administrative (administered) market.15 It significantly differs from Soviet-type
apologetic myths as well as from phantasies about working plans. It also differs from
assumptions that nothing really worked in the Soviet Union. At the same time, it is compatible
with approaches coined by the Hungarian economist Janos Kornai (economics of shortage,
                                                
13  Lev Timofeev, Kto nam dolzhen? Kto nam platit? In: Moskovskie Novosti, 1997, 28 (13.-20.07.), 5.
14  The phenomenon of blat is superbly described and analyzed by Alena V. Ledeneva, Practices of Exchange
and Networking in Russia: Three Aspects of the Conceptualization of blat. Paper for the BASEES
Conference, Panel „Informal Practices in Eastern Europe“, Cambridge, 12.-14.04.1997. See also Stefanie
Harter, Wirtschaftliche Transformation in Rußland. Ein Netzwerksansatz. Arbeitspapiere des Osteuropa-
Instituts (FU Berlin), 1997, Nr. 5.
15 See Vitalij Naishul, The Supreme and Last Stage of Socialism. The Center for Research into Communist
Economies, London 1991; Simon Kordonskij, The Structure of Economic Space in Post-Perestroika Society
and the Transformation of the Administrative Market, in: Klaus Segbers, Stephan DeSpiegeleire (eds.), Post-
Soviet Puzzles: Mapping the Political Economy of the Former Soviet Union, Vol. 1, Baden-Baden 1995, S.
157-204.
soft budget constraints), with principal agent approaches and, in general, with insights
generated by new political economists’ interpretations.
Given that this reasoning is plausible, it underlines once more that the main interest regarding
the changes in the FSU since 1985/91 should not that much focus on the introduction of the
market, of democracy and so on. We rather should concentrate on how the vectors of the AM,
and how its functional logic change. Administrative valuta gradually turns into real money.
Positions of relevant actors shift and change. The collapse of the old center – the principal, i.e.
the CPSU leadership  generating and notifying statuses and rights – must be compensated
somehow.  For this reason alone, the new forms of property rights and their formalization are
one of the most fruitful dimensions of institutional change and, therefore, for research.
That the reshaping and deeopment of property rights is taking place by bargaining among the
most relevant actors, that they more often than not have the form or torgi, is characteristic for
the current stage of changes.
3.4 Communication among the actors: the role of the media
Contrary to many assumptions, the public was an important instrument also in Soviet times –
even in its organized forms. It was an institution of regulation, which could be used in the
framework of a harshly regulated grammar, the ideology, for nuances and for communicating
certain interpretations. At the same time, it also produced – or had a section of – unofficial
counter discourses: songs, holidays, and other forms of life.
Since 1985, in the difficult times of big and rapid changes, with many unclear and unfixed
boundaries of right and wrong, success and failure, the mass media play a very important role
in the games of distribution, positioning and all the activities in the framework of the AM.
Quite naturally, the effects and functions of the mass media, their influence and the control of
them are another important field of political and economic conflicts. This is especially true for
the elctronic/ TV-stations, which belong to the most critical objects of desire in all political
camps and interest groups. Economic lobbies strive for the media  -- not so much yet as
sources of profit, but rather as channels for promoting their immediate interests, as the
presidential elections in 1996 amply illustrated.
The so-calles „bankers’ war“ in summer of 1997, the various campaigns and innuendos
against individual politicians and businessmen are proof for the increasing role of the media.
3.5 Space: expansion, contraction, and asymmetrical federalism
Space can – and probably must – be understood as a decisive factor for Russia. It seems to be
so vast, immeasurable, that attempts to govern and regulate it may lead just to political
excessiveness. „The inclinations of spread and settlement can be further described as
horizontal and vertical, centrifugal and centripetal, spill-over and crystallization, femininity
and masculinity..., heterarchy and hierarchy of Russian space.“16
                                                
16  Sergei Medvedev, The General Theory of Russian Space: A Gay Science and a Rigouros Science. Mimeo,
Helsinki 1996, p. 10.
Space in Russia was and is a vast territory which determined time perceptions, mentalities,
and arcitecture. For the economy and social relations, it was rather a determinant factor than
an institution. The enormous spaces obviously led to a striving for ever more space, which in
itself was accompanied by permanent problems of coordination. These required specific
political, economic and social forms of  regulation.
One of these determinants of regulating space was the dichotomy between the center and
peripheries. Their interrelations were organized by strictly hierarchized, not logically or
functionally structured administrative entities. These entities served primarily administrative
purposes, but to a certain extent they also resembled cultural (ethnic) features. In sum, the
teritorial-administrative system had many traces of irrationality. The Soviet and post-Soviet
borders between these entities often differed from historical, cultural, linguistic and other
organic borders. The newly created contexts rested primarily on the political force of the
center (which always also was simulated) and ist options to redistribute resources and to
produce thereby political loyalties.
The center was the central agent for modernization; it was the place where – theoretically - all
power was concentrated, and where, at the same time, powerlessness was located. From the
provinces’ perspective, the center is far away, and it is wise to rely onto one’s own strength
and options, while, at the same time, one bowes symbolically  towards the center. This
ambivalent relationship was a viable institution as long as the amount of available resources
served the purpose of mediating spatial, federal and sectoral conflicts. The new and troubling
factor is the non-availability of these resources, which therefore cannot any longer serve this
mediating role.
At the same time, a new equilibrium between the center and the provinces is developing since
1996. Important indicators for this institutional change are: The formalization of  interactions
and dependencies in the form of treaties between the federal Moscow and the regions; the fact
that almost all governors have been elected by now and that this makes their moves more
legitimate and forceful; a new, enhanced role for the Council of Federation as a mediator
between groups dominating the government and the State Duma, respectively.17 All these
tendencies are elements of a new formalized division of responsibility, of spheres of influence
between the main actors in the post-Soviet space.
3.6 Identity by position and activities in byt
More difficult is a phenomenon which at least partly is shaped by institutions (norms, rules
etc.) – the Russians’ common sense (as part of their identity). What are the basic orientiations
of Russians in their everyday life? They don’t seem to reflect that much on this matter. They
are busy trying to understand and adopt to the new rules of the game – and to develop survival
and adaptation techniques. But, probably, some common fatures of „Russianness“ can be
determined. One of the most interesting  dimensions of the changes in Russia is the
transformation of the common places18.
                                                
17  Cf. Sergei Medvedev, Russia’s Regional Elections: A Step Towards Federalism. Mimeo, Helsinki 1997.
18  See for a stimulating discussion Svetlana Boym, Common Places. Mythologies of Everyday Life in Russia.
Cambridge, London: Harvard UP, 1994.
For many people, this factor constitutes the most fundamental change in their lives. And to
come to terms with it, one element is needed more than everything else: time. The new
economy of time is irreversible, the logic of new functional conditions has been established. If
the everyday lives can be organized in a more stable way, the people will be more ready to
accept the irritations connected with the changes.
In this context we should not forget that also in Soviet times, all forms of individual and semi-
autonomous activities took place. Without that capability, the USSR, given their systemic
defects,  would not have survived that long. The tolkachi, informal exchanges of goods, blat,
the AM – all these phenomena were expressions of initiatives of individuals and groups under
difficult conditions.
So it is less surprising than often assumed that now, under more stress than ever after 1945,
these capabilities are even clearer developed. We meet  this quality of  individual acitivity in
almost all sectors of society – in useful and healthy forms as well as in unwelcome forms
(terrorism etc.). But „legality“ is not a productive issue here.
The basic mode of intiative is the increasing capability of self-reproduction, i.e. to adapt
oneself to new rules and to develop specific forms of  survival. The spectre of these
qualifications includes businessmen as well as researchers, old babushki as well as mafia
soldiers. And the main feature of the „new“, changing common places is their rationalization
– as indicated by the fate of the famous kitchen situations.
To sum up, the presented six institutions are old and new at the same time. What has to be
analyzed is the direction of change they are exposed to. (1) Relations between state and
society stay tense, but the latter currently has more strength to keep the country more or less
together. (2) Property rights are being established partly by formalizing old patterns, partly by
redistributing access possibilities. (3) The rules of the game stay fluid, and distribution and
exchange of resources are still mainly objects of torgi. (4) Communication between the
relevant actors was and remains important, and the media became a prime target for
competition. (5) Space is still a decisive factor for shaping almost everything in Russia and
can hardly be effectively „organized“, but center-periphery relations seem to become more
regular. And (6) common places become more rational, nor necessarily more civilized, and
betray a surprising capability of most Russians to adapt to difficult new conditions.
4 Which - domestic and international - structures are important
(decisive) for the transformations?
After having described crucial institutions which are currently being transformed, we now
look at them as dependent variables and identify those factors which shape the direction, the
speed and the forms of their changes.
A first important external factor are the combined processes of globalization and
fragmentation. Communication, information, life- and consumption patterns, the production
and  exchanges of capital and services are more and more integrated. In many respect, bipolar
and other models of  the world have been replaced by the one model of one world. This not
only makes interventions of nation states increasingly obsolete. The all-encompassing
character of this tendency prohibits effectively all isolated options of development and
modernization. Opting out is not an option, or it seems to be a synonym for ignorance. But
being included in the processes of gobalization, acceleration and marketization of time, also
means becoming an object of  fragmentation of nation states, of social and societal contexts,
of  ways of living (Lebenswelten). Counter-strategies do not seem to find a realistic focus;
instead, integration enhances phenomena like territorial regionalization,  deregulations and
fundamentalisms.
These two basic trends were already conducive for the late USSR which was confronted with
world-wide dynamic processes of  integration, competition and technologic developments.
Given her old-fashioned, unproductive and lethargic regulation systems, she could not cope
with these structural challenges. This is the external context which made dramatic domestic
changes – accelerated and weakly directed institutional changes – unavoidable. This also was
the structural setting which all reform attempts of domestic elites could – and can – not
transcend.19
Fragmentation in the neighborhoods of Russia also shape Russian transformations. Most of
the other successor states are weak and rather simulations of states. China on Russia’s souther
border is no longer an example of stability, given regionalization tendencies and ethnic
conflicts in ist northern provinces. Many contacts and acitivities – migration, trade, etc. – are
controlled neither by the federal governments nor by regional administrations.
All attempts to create a Russian ideology and many folcloristic strategies by regional leaders
to establish regional Russian identies cannot remake the effects of international information
and communication inroads. By this way, by infos, ads and music, life patterns and life styles
are transported  -- from Mac World to Russia. The information lines leading out of Russia are
less busy – they are frequented basically when there are scandals, accidents and coups...
Journalists kidnapped somewhere in Chechnya as hostages and traded for cash are one of the
recent examples how patterns set in Latin America or elsewhere are studied and tested in
Russia as a measure for modernization.
Whatever individual perception capabilities of this international environment and its features
are – most people share a feeling of stress. This feeling is enhanced by the fact that one
important domestic factor for the ongoing transformations is that important parameters of the
Soviet model are gone forever: The extensive mode of production, soft budget constraints, an
affluant labor force, cheap and easily accessible resources – all these elements have vanished.
The center as the „principal“ became increasingly helpless, it had less and less resources at ist
disposal, and it could not cope with the expectations of  relevant „agents“.20 The whole
system collapsed because of the shortage of transferable resources and the subsequent
defection of regional and sectoral interest groups and personal networks. This was the
decisive internal background for the acceleration of modernization by integration into the
                                                
19 See Daniel Deudney, John G. Ikenberry: The International Sources of Soviet Change, in: International
Security, Vol. 16.3 (1991), S. 74-118, and  ibid.., Soviet Reform and the End of the Cold War: Explaining
Large-Scale Historical Change, in: Frederic F. Fleron, Erik P. Hoffmann (eds.), Post-Communist Studies and
Political Science, Boulder, 1993, S. 205-238.
20 Vgl. Steven Solnick, The Breakdown of Hierarchies in the Soviet Union and China: A Neoinstitutional
Perspective, in: World Politics, Vol. 48.2 (1996), S. 209-238.
world system, which first produced perestroika and later the systemic institutional changes
known to us.
The final internal crisis of the traditional Soviet mode of reproduction explains that and why
fundamental changes of the economic, social, political and cultural regulations became
necessary. The external conditions  -- globalization and fragmentation – define the
constraints for the reactions and the space in which options of change had and have to
operate. The ongoing institutionl change is confronted with a double phenomenon:  The
legacy of the classic Soviet model by continuing effects of  certain pre- and Soviet
institutions, especially the AM; and external limits, which do not allow opting out strategies.
Both effects together determine chances as well as risks of the Russian future.
These are the structural conditions which determine and shape institutional change in Russia.
Who acts in this framework, and what are the interests at stake?
5 A Look at the actors: Which are relevant? What are their
interests?
Any strong orientation on „high politics“ in the center - i.e. Moscow - leads to superficial
impressions. What is required is the identification of the real players – actors – and their
interests, preferences and resources --  a task to be repeated over and over again. This can and
must be combined with the definition of relevant  units and levels of analysis. Whatever
specific results in a given moment will be – the federal executive (state) will be amongst the
important actors, but it never will be the only relevant one.
For Western analyses, the definition of the real interests and the real players in the FSU-
successor states is important. Here it is useful to start by repeating the thesis that the changes
in the FSU cannot be traced back to a point zero (neither  1985 nor 1991), but they fit into a
long-range tendency of modernization . Most of the actors who act now  held important
positions also in Soviet times. (For clarification: ideological intransigence of the old
nomenklatura is not a point here). Now, these individuals and groups try to strengthen,
enhance, legalize their positions, or at least to avoid theor downgrading. These players build
their preferences accordingly. Their moves drive the institutional changes.
Underneath this surface, irrespective of all polemics, ideologies and  quarrels, there are just a
few issues which really matter for relevant players, and which are the core of all  fights. It is
not surprising that   the core interest are related to central  elements of institutional change.
While there are relatively stable and rather fluid interests, the list of the predominatly stable
interests consists of the following:
* To survive under new and difficult conditions of accelerated change. This is the central task
of  relevant actors in post-Soviet spaces. This interest is connected with a striving to shape,
understand and exploit the rules of the game. Beyond theses motives, there are hardly
intentions and capabilities to actively influence and model the respective environments.
* To influence the distribution of competences and leverages for  distributing resources,
including to formalize acquisitions legally. Therefore, disputes about the models,
strategies, results and effects of privatization, about the privileges of the „natural
monopolies“ and the interfaces/ intersections between federal, regional and sectoral
property rights are so intense and tense. For the same reason, no one of the big players is
interested in rebuilding Soviet-type operating conditions.
* To politically move towards decisive deferal and regional centers of influence and of power
regarding the distribution of resources. This explains the great interest in presidential as well
as in gubernatorial elections. Therefore, these elections are conflict-ridden far beyond their
actual political significance.
* To influence the relations between the politico-territorial and the national-territorial
administrative units in the RF as well as the relations between them and the federal center.
Status, competences and perspectives of the „subjects of the Federation“ are important
issues for bargaining processes.
* To determine positions towards world markets and international agencies, in terms of
opening up or protectionism.
* To protect the individual security of  agents and actors – for many quite an important motive
of behavior, by running for deputy seats in parliaments, or by hiring private guards.
This priority list implies that taking positions concerning international matters is of  less
importance, if not totally irrelevant. This is not a decisive resource for domestic interests, and
thus is left beyond the scope of preferences building by most actors.
Other topics may come up as corollary issues, often drifting from group to group. As a rule,
they are exploited by different, often competing groups, and they are used as measure (litmus
test) for the political weight or the homogeneity of other groups. Terms like „refom-minded“,
„democratic“, „patriotic“, „Russianness“ etc. cannot be defined in a meaningful way and are,
therefore, ideal to be filled with whatever concepts or suggestion which promises to serve
useful purposes. They are important not by themselves but because they function to enhance
the primary interests and the positions of the relevant players. These terms have the value of
gatekeepers for the main political discourse.
The relevant groups and individuals promote their respective interests not that much
strategically but rather in a day-to-day manner. Time horizons are extremely short. It is
important to act and react fast, to move quickly, to stabilize and enhance positions in a highly
unstable environment – and this requires more ad-hocism than long-term moves. Many
Western guesses regarding „deeper motives“ and hidden agendas of the important players
miss this ratio of post-Soviet behavior and are, in their suggestions, often beyond the point.
What now are the relevant interest groups, of lobbies, networks and players? By leaving out
the regional dimension – to be addressed later – we have identified the following main interest
groups for Russia, Ukraine and Belarus’ for the years 1994-9621:
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 2 Exchanges, insurance companies etc.
 3 Trade and retail organizations
Export-oriented sectors (emanated from the state sector)
 4 Oil and pipelines
 5 Gas and pipelines
 6 Aircrafts and aerospace (MIC I)
 7 Non-ferrous metals
 8 Gold and diamonds
Domestic market-oriented sectors (emanated from the state sector)
 9 Agroindustrial complex (AIC)
10 Coal industry
11 Transport (railroads - MPS)
12 Nuclear sector and electricity networks (EES)
13 Electronic and science-intensive branches (MIC II)
14 Other producers of weapons (MIC III)
15 Other processing industries
Central (federal) state structures
16 Executive structures (apparatuses of the president, the council of ministers, central
economic agencies)
17 Central bank
18 Council of  the Federation
19 State committee for property (GKI)
20 Apparatuses of the representative  structures (Federal /Sobranie/)
Power apparatuses (agencies)
21 Ministry of Defense, General staff
22 Ministry of the Interior
23 Other power and security apparatuses
24 Border troops
25 Paramilitary private formations (ethnic, political, local, private)
Civic (societal) structures
26 Individual party leaders
27 Individual deputies in parliaments





33 Federal (electronic) mass media
International interest groups
34 Foreign firms, capital groups
35 IMF, World Bank,  G 7 and others
An additional important element of  political configurations and power relations are regional
actors, especially administrative elites of  donor regions, intra-regional  associations and big
cities administrations.22 Regional administrative elites cooperate often with powerful sectoral
interests groups, and they are present in the Federation Council and therefore in the political
center. Furthermore, almost all of them are now elected by regional populations and therefore
more independent from Moscow interventions.
All these main interest groups act independently, while they also, at least sometimes, build
coalitions. The political space in the RF is the expression of the activities of all these actors. It
cannot be reduced to formal structures. In many respects, the Russian government is still
rather a coalition of certain groupings and lobbies who converge on some interests, than a
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coherent, administrative bloc. That is true even for the energetic new government established
in spring 1997.
This picture of  the political space betrays a significant  fragmentation and, thus, expresses
reality as it is. It becomes clear what groups and sub-groupings do exist, and what their main
interests are. But, politically, this picture is to heterogenous to serve as a tool for analytical
and, even more so, political consequences. So it is useful to think about possibilities to cluster
these groups into some main categories, bound together by certain and important common
interests.
And indeed – expert polls, their quantitative analysis, case studies and other observations
show that at least for the time from 1993 to 1996,  three main positional groupings – or
political camps --  can be identified in the Russian political landscape: stabilisers;
redistributors; and fundamentalists/ individualists.
These categories also proved useful in a political sense, because the last elections (presidential
elections 1991 and 1996, elections for the parliament in 1993 and 1995) showed that the
political forces acted basically along the lines proposed here. At the same time it became
visible again that the focus on groups like political parties and on individual activists is not
fruitful at all when one is interested in determining the real players and their motives and
behavior.
The stabilizers understood on time that huge transformations and changes were ahead. They
acted accordingly and tried to exploit new options, often using their administrative positions
in the perestroika-years. By origin and world views, they are heterogeneous. There we find
directors of privileged state enterprises, regional administrators, heads or functionaries of
industrial sectors, former komsomol’cy, but also new people, highly qualified, mobile and
ready to use the opportunities offered by highly fluid operative conditions.
The main interest of this grouping is to avoid new peredely sobstvennosti (evaluations and
redistributions of property rights) and to guarantee a basic stability of the political and
economic ramifications as well as of the social  situation.23 Therefore, they favor the
observation of the existing rules of the game (institutional norms, like the constitution,
national and international formula of consensus, and in general – „not to rock the boat“) as
long as these norms do not conflict with their basic goals. If that happens, norms are modified
or suspended (like election rhythms etc.). The stabilizers would have to lose a lot when
significant corrections if the basic determinants of the general political course would take
place. That is the reason why they support the current regime, its individual representative,
and why they want to secure a calm and guaranteed succession. The stabilizers are the main
fundaments of a continuing, gradual institutional change, and because of that they are the
preferred partners of the dominant Western interests.
                                                
23  It is useful to differentiate between two distinct forms of stability: Situative and strategic stability. What I
have in mind here is a common interest of certain pressure groups to diminish the difference between theses
two meanings. Cf. Vladimir Pastuchov, Paradoksal’nye zametki o sovremennom politicheskom rezhime, in:
Pro et Contra, Vol. 1.1 (Autumn 1996), 6-21, here p. 7 ff.
The most important elements of the stabilizers are: banks and  other spheres of circulation,
TEK, exporters, partly importers. Names of representatives: E’lcin, Chernomyrdin, Chubais,
Nemtsov, Baturin, Berezovskii, Potanin, Gusinskii, Stroev, Shochin, Shaimiev, Rossel’,
Titov, etc. Most of the federal electronic media also belog here. In a certain sense, the
stabilizers may be called the partiia vlasti, the party of the new/ current power.24
The redistributors differ from the stabilizers primarily by the wish to replace the latter. No
other definition could be more exact. Their origin is also heterogeneous, but here one can find
less new and young and energetic vydvizhency. The resdistributors represent less privileged
and consequently depressive regions and sectors, producers oriented towards the domestic
markets, many  people working in the middel and lower levels of the state sector, parts of the
agricultural sector and a majority of the elder generation.
The CPRF is the main representative of  these groups and interests. They overwhelmingly do
not favor a return to Soviet conditions, but a they want to become winners under the new
conditions.
The power structures (apparatuses) are partly not interested in politics, partly fragmented.
Individualists, Opportunists and  Fundamentalists are those who do not belong to one of the
main two camps. They are extremely heterogenous in any sense. Many of them are politially
weak, with modest resources, and are eager to go with those who offer them something for
support.
Following this categorization into three main camps, we can draw the following picture for
the end of 1996/ early 1997 (groups who are ambivalent are printed in italics):
Stabilizers
 1 Banks
 2 Exchanges, insurences etc.
 3 Trade and retail organizations
 4 Oil and pipelines
 5 Gas and pipelines
 6 Aircrafts and aerospace (MIC I)
 7 Non-ferrous metals
 8 Gold and diamonds
16 Executive structures (apparatuses of the president, the council of ministers, central
economic agencies)
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17 Central bank
18 Council of Federation
19 State committee for property (GKI)
20 Apparatuses of the representative  structures (Federal /Sobranie/)
21 Ministry of Defense, General staff
22 Ministry of the Interior
23 Other power and security apparatuses
24 Border troops
25 Paramilitary private formations (ethnic, political, local, private)
26 Inidividual party leaders





33 Federal (electronic) mass media
34 Foreign firms, capital groups
35 IMF, World Bank,  G 7 and others
Redistributors
 9 Agroindustrial complex
10 Coal industry
11 Transport sector (MPS)
12 Nuclear sector and electricity networks (EES)
13 Electronic and science intensive branches (MIC II)
14 Other weapons producers (MIC III):
15 Other processing industries
20 Apparatuses of representative structures
23 Other security/ power apparatuses
25 Paramilitary formations
26 Individual party leaders
27 Individual deputies




Other categorizations lead to similar results – at least in the basic ways of clustering relevant
interests in winners and losers.25
6 Post-Soviet Change and IR
Until now, it became clear that the pluralization of ators and spaces will be a constant factor
for Russian politics. This necessarily leads to inconsistencies of domestic as well as of
foreign politics. westliche (staatliche wie gesellschaftliche) Politk Interpretations- und
Strategieprobleme auf. For Western policy options, this creates analytical and stratgic
problems: How to identify relevant actors? What are their basic interests? How to include
them into contact strategies and into international regimes?
Given the dramatic changes of the international system which became visible and
characteristic after 1989, the sometimes irrtitating panrama of Russian foreign policy rhetoric
and behavior seems less exraordinary confuse as often assumed. A definite turn of elites
towards domestic problems is a key feature of post 1989 politics everywhere.
In any case, foreign policy in Russia is, as such, not of much relevance. The interface between
the interests of the dominant Russian actors (to accumulate capital and resources) and the rest
of the world is –from the perspective of Russian players – sifnificant only then and insofar, as
primary iterests of Russian actors are concerned.
This leads directly to the thesis that for the foreseeable future, Russian actors are not able to
define concisesly  valid national interests and to build a natiuonal consensus around them.
This is exacerbated by the absence of any immediate interest to actively shape politics beyond
the immediate concerns. In consequence, we must accept the particularistic character of
foreign policy related moves and behavior in Russia.
The Russian state is not – yet? -- in the position to act as  the representative of national
interests. Instead, its representatives engage in simulationg them. Western politics which want
to address this situation adequately have to take into account the fragmented situation as it is.
By developing their political strategies, Western actors definitely have to take into account
much more non-state actors in Russia. Only political strategies focusing also on these levels
may be effective.
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